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FOUR FEMINIST THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND THE
DOUBLE BIND OF SURROGACY
MARY BECKER*
INTRODUCTION
I have been asked to give a brief overview of modern feminist
legal theory. It is going to be very difficult because this has become an
incredibly rich body of work. The modern wave of the feminist move-
ment began with an assumption that there was one way to approach
sexism in law and that was to use formal equality to get rid of rules
that treated women and men differently. There wasn't much in the
way of real theory behind that approach, other than the important
insight that if you do treat men and women differently, you are per-
petuating traditional stereotypes and pushing people into traditional
roles in ways that are not healthy for the human spirit.
Today, and increasingly since 1979, feminist legal theory is a di-
verse body of work with many people arguing for many approaches.
The explosion began in 1979 with Catharine MacKinnon's Sexual Har-
assment of Working Women and MacKinnon began by critiquing for-
mal equality. MacKinnon points out that formal equality sounds
gender-neutral. It sounds fair. You treat men and women similarly,
without any bias in favor of either group. But if you stop and think
about it, it is androcentric. It gives women who look like men the
right to the rules and practices men have worked out for themselves,
so that if a woman is at a law firm she has the right, if she bills 2,700
hours a year, to be treated like the men who work that number of
hours. But, of course, many women are not similarly situated to men.
Many women who work at firms have quite different responsibilities
when they go home at night than the men at those firms, and if all
your equality standard gives you is the right to the rules developed by
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and for men with wives, it is not going to be gender-neutral, it is actu-
ally an androcentric standard.'
In addition, MacKinnon says, if you stop and think about it, the
core of discrimination is not treating similarly situated men and wo-
men differently. The core of discrimination is not that men who are
breadwinners are treated differently from women who are breadwin-
ners, right? The core of discrimination is that systematically, time af-
ter time after time, differences between men and women, whether real
or perceived, are turned, as a result of social practices, into advantages
for men and disadvantages for women.2 The problem is that bread-
winners and homemakers are treated so differently, not that women
who are breadwinners are treated so differently from men who are
breadwinners, or that women who are homemakers are treated so dif-
ferently from men who are homemakers.
Because of differences that seem to justify different treatment,
we treat homemakers and breadwinners in ways that create hierarchy
between women and men. It is the systemic creation of hierarchy-
out of real or perceived differences-that forms the core of discrimi-
nation. To see discrimination, you must focus on differences between
men and women, because that is often where social practices create
inequality. Note the break from formal equality where differences
justify differential treatment and, hence, inequality.
For MacKinnon, the bottom line, the thing that needs continuous
attention if we are determined to eradicate the inequality between the
sexes, is power. We need to scrutinize whatever systematically gives
men a power-related advantage relative to women, whether it be via
political power, economic resources, or whatever. And we need to
look most especially for power inequities created when society per-
ceives differences between the sexes.
Not all modern feminist legal theorists embrace MacKinnon's al-
ternative to formal equality. In Part I of this overview I present two
other alternatives: one by Robin West and one by Margaret Radin. In
Part II I discuss all four approaches in the context of a specific legal
question to illustrate their practical applications. I conclude with
some observations on the advantages of having a variety of ap-
proaches available in arguing about equality between the sexes.
1. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 106-16
(1979) [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT]; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED 32-45 (1987).
2. SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 1, at 117-18 (1979).
[Vol. 69:303
FOUR FEMINIST THEORETICAL APPROACHES
I. HEDONIC AND PRAGMATIC APPROACHES
One alternative to formal equality and MacKinnon's approach is
Robin West's hedonic approach. 3 West says that MacKinnon surely is
right in noting that power is important and that women need more
power and men, less. But West says that another problem is that wo-
men's suffering is not heard by the legal system.4 Women's suffering
and pain are very hard to translate into legal arguments. In tort and
criminal law, it is often hard to translate women's fear of rape into
arguments that can be heard in a court of law. It is often hard to
translate women's parental responsibilities and the importance of
their relationships to their children and the texture of that relationship
into ways that can be heard when you are arguing for the appropriate
custody standard in a court of law. West says that feminists need to
focus on translating women's pleasures and pains, which are often dif-
ferent from men's pleasures and pains, into words that are legally au-
dible. And it may be that there are contexts in which improving the
quality of women's hedonic lives-increasing women's felt pleasures
and decreasing women's felt pains-is more important than power.
As individuals, none of us seek only and always primarily power in
our own lives. There are many things we put above power. Perhaps,
in working for women's collective interests, we also need to consider,
in some contexts, women's interests in other aspects of their lives.
The final alternative to formal equality is Margaret Radin's prag-
matic feminism.5 Radin says there are going to be problems with any
single approach, any grand theory that you use to approach all legal
questions. Human beings do not have the mental ability to sit in
armchairs or look out of ivory towers and see what is going to work
best for all women, for all time, in all contexts. Instead, we should
realize that in approaching any legal question, there are advantages
and disadvantages to each solution and our resolution of an issue
should therefore be pragmatic. We should be looking not at grand
theory, but at what are the real world advantages and disadvantages
to solution A and to solution B in this particular context.
6
One can make this point in the context of West's hedonic theory.
If we only do what makes women comfortable-in a world where
many women are not socialized to seek success, but are socialized to
3. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Cri-
tique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987).
4. Id. at 82.
5. Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990).
6. See generally id.
19931
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think of caretaking as that for which they are particularly made-this
approach might be self-defeating in the long term. This is true both
for women in general and for the individual woman who may end up
feeling that she has not developed herself and has too little of her own
in her life after the children are gone. And, in general, women's status
cannot change significantly unless significant numbers of women do
things that they find challenging rather than comforting.
II. APPLICATION OF THE FOUR APPROACHES TO THE
SURROGACY ISSUE
Thus far, I have suggested that we cannot apply any one theory to
each and every question in a mechanical fashion without looking at
the advantages and disadvantages to each approach. Now I apply
each of the four approaches discussed above to a single legal issue.
The four approaches are formal equality, MacKinnon's dominance ap-
proach, West's hedonic approach, and Radin's pragmatic approach.
The issue I chose for illustration involves paid surrogacy: should spe-
cific performance be available when a surrogate mother, someone
who has borne the child "using" her own ovum, decides, around the
time of the birth of the child, that she does not want to go through
with the contract? Should the father be able to come in and compel
her to deliver the child in exchange for the agreed-upon sum?
I begin with formal equality. To apply formal equality you need
similarly situated men and women. To make sex an equality issue, we
must find similarly situated men. People who use formal equality tend
to find analogies in one of two areas. Some find sperm donation to be
an analogous event. Sperm donors are able to sign contracts, and
those contracts are enforced.7 The sperm donor cannot afterward try
to retain parental rights after signing away all rights when the sperm is
donated for fifty dollars. Formal-equality proponents often use an-
other analogy in the surrogacy context: the sale of goods. We do give
specific performance for the sale of unique finished goods. A child is
a unique finished good; therefore, specific performance is
appropriate. 8
7. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 16 LAW,
MED., & HEALTH CARE 72 (1988).
8. See, e.g., MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 79-83 (1988) (discussing anal-
ogy to specific performance of finished goods). This is a somewhat awkward argument to make
because to the extent the transaction is seen as delivery of a unique finished good for a price, it
looks like the illegal sale of a baby.
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There are obvious weaknesses with both analogies. Sperm dona-
tion for fifty dollars is hardly the same as carrying a child to term. To
see as equivalent the situations of the mother who has just given birth
to a child she has carried for nine months and the sperm donor who
walks away with $50 in his pocket after depositing the sperm in the
bank is to deny the reality of women's unique experiences during
pregnancy and childbirth. The other analogy-the sale of finished
goods-is also weak. A child is not simply a finished good. The rela-
tionship between a mother and a child at the end of pregnancy, re-
gardless of whether she ever signed a surrogacy contract, is
emotionally quite different from someone who has just finished pro-
ducing, say, a watch or a ring or some other "good." It is surely far
easier to turn one's back on the watch or ring and walk away without
regrets or serious emotional consequences. Given the absence of any
strong analogy, formal equality is indeterminate here; it cannot tell us
how to solve this problem.
What about a dominance approach-MacKinnon's approach?
Here, the focus is on power. Would legal enforcement or nonenforce-
ment of the surrogate's promise to give the new born child to her fa-
ther be more likely to redress power inequities between men and
women? Which approach would be inappropriate because it is yet
another translation of differences into advantages for men and disad-
vantages for women? And which approach would be appropriate be-
cause it is not the translation of differences into power inequities
favoring men? MacKinnon herself is hostile to paid surrogacy and to
the enforcement of paid surrogacy contracts.9 She sees enforceable
surrogacy contracts as another instance of male control over women's
bodies. Such contracts, she argues, are analogous to prostitution in
that women's bodies are taken and paid for, for the use of men.10
But nonenforcement of surrogacy contracts can also operate to
translate differences into advantages for men. For many poor women
with few economic options, surrogacy arrangements might be desira-
ble. And, if such arrangements are legally enforceable, it might be
easier for these women to enter into such contracts at a good price.
Perhaps most women who signed such contracts would never regret
having done so, despite the emotional cost, given the economic advan-
tages and their needs.
9. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 246, 248
(1989).
10. Id.
1993]
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Thus, at least some women might have more power were women
able to enter into binding surrogacy contracts. After all, traditionally,
the common law disempowered women by refusing to give married
women the ability to contract. It took the married women's property
acts in the nineteenth century to change that. The ability to contract
when other people in a market economy can contract often-al-
ways?-gives one power.
There are conflicting interests among women on this issue, partic-
ularly along the lines of class and race. Surrogacy is likely to increase
the commodification of all women-that is, the extent to which we
view all women as commodities with a market price linked to men's
valuation of them." From this perspective, surrogacy is almost en-
tirely a negative for most women, particularly middle and upper class
women, who would be uninterested in being surrogates and disadvan-
taged by the increased commodification of women. Similarly, women
of color will be mostly hurt by enforceability of paid surrogacy be-
cause, though disproportionately working class or poor, women of
color are less likely to be surrogates than white women because of
both racial bias (white fathers will not usually want a surrogate of
color) and the fact that men of color are less likely to be able to pay
for a surrogacy contract than white men. Working-class white women
is the group most likely to benefit from surrogacy. The dominance
approach tells us nothing about how to resolve conflicts among wo-
men. More fundamentally, like formal equality, a power analysis is
indeterminate. You can make power arguments both ways.
A hedonic focus might require that we actually go out to the real
world and talk to real women. The question would be: what advan-
tages and disadvantages do women who are considering or who have
entered into these relationships feel about the various approaches?
What approach would best serve their felt needs, especially, perhaps,
the needs of the most vulnerable women? How many women do
change their minds either at or after the birth of the child? How many
more end up sorry they entered into the arrangement, although they
do go through with it?12 How many feel torn and hurt for life as a
result of going into the contract? How many, on the other hand, feel
content with their choice and glad they were able to choose this eco-
nomic opportunity? Again, I think there is likely to be no clear an-
11. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1928-36 (1987).
12. See, e.g., ELIZABETH KANE, BIRTH MOTHER: THE STORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST LEGAL
SURROGATE MOTHER (1988).
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swer. And, again, we will not know how to resolve conflicting
interests among different women, if our interviews do reveal such con-
flicts. Perhaps we should be especially concerned to improve the lives
of the most vulnerable women. 13
Pragmatism can help us to understand why it is that these grand
theories often actually provide us with very little in the way of con-
crete guidance for how to resolve a specific issue. Surrogacy is a
double bind; like most legal issues there will be advantages and disad-
vantages to whatever we do.14 There are advantages and disadvan-
tages both to nonenforcement and specific enforcement. If we do not
enforce these contracts at all,15 it means women cannot choose to
market their reproductive labor via specifically enforceable contracts.
Poor women will have fewer choices, and inevitably, all women will
continue to face the undervaluation of reproductive labor in a culture
which values things in terms of market prices.
On the other hand, enforcement means increased commodifica-
tion of women's bodies. It means that we are willing to treat what is
an essential aspect of a woman's being, her relationship with a child at
the end of pregnancy, as something that is fungible and traded on a
market. Women without much money will be tempted, because they
have so few other options, to sign contracts that might ultimately be
extremely painful for them to go through with. There are problems
with all solutions to surrogacy; that is one reason why none of the four
theoretical approaches suggests a clear resolution of the question.
From a pragmatic perspective all we can do is make our best
guess about what is likely to be best for women in this situation today.
Maybe what we need is some experimentation. Maybe we can't be
very sure. In any event, whatever we do we need to watch how things
work out in the real world and make continuous reassessments, con-
sidering whether in fact this is working out to be good for women or
13. See Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1764 (1990) (in context of pragmatism, making point that pragmatic ap-
proach should have first-principle of "anti-subordination.").
14. For a more complete discussion of the double bind in the context of surrogacy, see
Radin, supra note 11, at 1928-36.
15. Intermediate approaches are also imaginable. For example, specific performance might
not be an available remedy but damages could be available when the mother reneges. Under
ordinary contract rules, only nonspeculative damages would, however, be available. It is there-
fore likely that, under this approach, the father would only be able to recover out-of-pocket
costs, such as any money paid to the mother for expenses and money paid to others, such as
lawyers and medical-service providers. In any event, the discussion in the text is limited to the
two extreme solutions: specific enforcement or total nonenforcement (leaving the parties as they
stand when the transaction falls apart).
1993]
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bad for women. More generally, there is no pat formula that yields an
ideal solution on all issues for all women in all circumstances and for
all time. We need continuously to reassess and to experiment with
how to approach inequality between women and men rather than
thinking that we have one grand theory that will give us all the
answers.
CONCLUSION
I close by emphasizing that there are strengths and weaknesses to
the four approaches. Think of these various approaches as an arsenal.
You should bring out the best weapon depending on the context, de-
pending on what will work best in the particular situation you face.
For example, formal equality works very well when employment op-
portunities are closed to women who are similarly situated to men. It
is a very powerful weapon in that situation because it resonates very
strongly with powerful currents in our culture, such as individualism
and the right to equal opportunity. MacKinnon's dominance ap-
proach is especially powerful in the context of sexuality. Issues such
as sexual harassment, rape, and pornography all can be very effec-
tively analyzed with this approach. Her analysis helps one to see how
a sexual hierarchy is created in practices that seem natural and neutral
to somebody who has been raised in our culture. I think Robin West's
hedonic approach is very important in areas where women's emo-
tional lives are particularly important, as illustrated by the Tennessee
case discussed by Martha Craig Dantry and Leslie Bender. 16 A he-
donic approach is also important in thinking about custody standards
at divorce, where women's emotional ties to their children need to be
recognized and protected by the legal system because they are so im-
portant in the lives of so many women. 17
All else being equal, the goal of each of these theoretical ap-
proaches is good. All else being equal, it is good to have rules that
treat similarly situated men and women similarly. All else being
equal, you do not want to force women to be one way and men to be
another way or to assume that all women have certain characteristics
and interests and all men have others. All else being equal, women
need more power. Women should have more power and men less
power. And all else being equal, it is good to increase women's felt
16. See Leslie Bender, Is Tort Law Male? Foreseeability Analysis and Property Managers'
Liability for Third Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KEr L. REv. 313 (1993).
17. See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REv. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 133 (1992).
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pleasures and decrease women's felt pains. But often there are con-
flicts amongst these various goals and we have to recognize these in a
very pragmatic way, remaining conscious of the inevitable double
binds we face in balancing these goals in any specific context. As fem-
inists, we need to seek to improve the quality of women's felt lives as
well as seeking both more power and rules treating individuals as such
rather than as members of monolithic groups of women and men.

